Combating the opportunistic behavior of subjects in river water quality control systems
Abstract
Combating the opportunistic behavior of subjects in river water quality control systems
Incoming article date: 16.12.2018The article deals with the task of dealing with the opportunistic behavior of the supervisor and agents in the river water quality control system. A two-level hierarchical model is built, including a supervisor (master) and agents (slaves). Each of the subjects seeks to maximize their objective function. In the model, the principal is implicitly present, fighting against the opportunistic behavior of the supervisor and agents. As the method of control used the method of inducement. The behavior of the system is investigated in the case of Shtakelberg’s information regulations. The algorithm for finding the Stackelberg equilibrium is indicated. The results of model simulation under various initial conditions are demonstrated. An analysis of the results is provided.
Keywords: Shtakelberg equilibrium, two-level system, prompting, imitation, opportunistic behavior, river water quality, hierarchy