The article considers the application of the Stackelberg equilibrium model with a feedback mechanism for control under incentives. The relevance of the study is due to the need to improve the efficiency of interaction between construction participants - customers, contractors and investors - in the conditions of high competition, uncertainty and limited resources. It is proposed to formalize the dynamic interaction of the parties through a model that takes into account their interests and reactions to the current project parameters. The developed mathematical apparatus includes a two-level management structure, where the upper level is represented by the Customer, and the lower one is the General Contractor, and implements an approach with a feedback mechanism that allows adjusting strategies in real time. The conducted analytical and numerical modeling demonstrates the advantages of implementing such a model: increased stability of strategies, reduced implementation times, minimized risks of cost overruns and delays, as well as increased profits of participants. The obtained results confirm the efficiency of using the Stackelberg equilibrium model with feedback under incentives in the management of complex investment and construction projects, which contributes to the development of modern methods of strategic planning and system management in the construction industry. The results of numerical experiments are presented. A number of conclusions are made.

Keywords: two-level hierarchical model, Stackelberg equilibrium with feedback control under incentive, customer, general contractor, leader, follower

A two-level mathematical model of optimal management of investment and construction projects is proposed. The Customer acts as the upper-level or leading control entity in the model. The General Contractor is the lower-level control entity. It is assumed that both control entities strive to maximize their gain. The target function of the leader takes into account the estimated fixed income from apartment sales, profit from the velocity of money circulation, and the average estimated payment for work. The target function of the follower takes into account the payment for work from the Customer, additional payment or a fine, and payment for workers. The information regulations of the Stackelberg game are used in the study of the model. An algorithm for constructing a solution is given. In the general case, the problem is solved numerically by means of simulation modeling. The results of numerical experiments are given. A number of conclusions are made.

Keywords: two-level hierarchical model, Stackelberg equilibrium, customer, general contractor, leader, follower