Construction lending risks define a special operations procedure for lender. The most important measure to construction lending risk minimization are the covenants (information and financial). The information covenants are used for minimization the hidden information (pre-contractual opportunism), and financial covenants (positive and negative) – for minimization the hidden action (post-contractual opportunism). Institutionalization of covenants as a relevant control and supervision procedure allow to reduce information asymmetry and make the construction lending process less risky and more predictable for concerned parties (agent and principal).

Keywords: real estate financing, default risk, construction loans, credit capacity, debt, financial covenant

Growth of innovation processes in China is the result of changing of the global economic paradigm. The industrial sector was gradually transformed from labor-intensive to capital-intensive and then to high-tech production. Development of the new China industrial structure requires improvement of hard and soft infrastructures. The economy reformation into opening-up strategy allowed involving knowledge of the whole world and transforming the comparative advantages in the industrial modernization process. Rapid capital accumulation, modernization of funds and industrial structure held at the expense of accelerated mobilization of the off-the-self technologies, implemented in developed countries. Growth limits of the China new industries effectiveness depends largely on the fact that it becomes difficult to borrow the mature technologies. Further economic growth of China is associated with upgrade and development of hard and soft infrastructures, construction of transport-logistics and energy projects, development of modern knowledge.

Keywords: hard infrastructure, soft infrastructure, opening-up strategy, industrial modernization, innovation development, comparative advantages, construction of traffic facilities

Contract organization of project finance allow to reduce the asymmetric information, limiting the possibility of opportunistic actions of each participant. The back-to-back principle, that is underlying for contractual arrangements, increases total project return and provides transfer and split of highest possible number of risks directly to the contractual counterparty, which is best suited and have the most appropriate instruments to cover this risks. Tripartite deeds of project financing can be considered as a cooperative non-zero sum game, which provides compensation in proportion to covered risk and member's contribution (extent of assumed obligations or provided funds). Multiple contracts of project finance initiatives allow to allocate risks pro rata the ability of participants, without reducing the amount of final win of all parties.

Keywords: project finance, project financing risks, asymmetric information, agency theory, contractual arrangements, back-to-back principle, concession agreement, purchaser contract, tripartite deed, game theory